The overall goal of this core is to provide the infrastructure and support to macroscopically and microscopically examine cells and tissue specimens containing biological agents that require high containment until the cell or tissue samples are in a neutralized and non-infectious state. The Cell and Tissue Imaging Core (CTIC) at the NEIDL will offer a range of imaging systems to analyze specimens using state-of-the-art technologies. The availability of several high resolution microscopy platforms will allow NEIDL investigators to gather information from multi-probe, live cell analyses. Such infrastructure will help users to understand the host cell/pathogen interactions and permit targeted, pathological assessment of infected tissues from experimentally infected animals. Knowing the tomography, interconnectivity and morphology of cells and organelles in three-dimensions (3D) in living infected tissues is invaluable for understanding the in vivo behavior and pathogenesis of infectious agents. The operational goals of CITC are: a. To provide the infrastructure and expertise to visualize BSL-4 pathogens in their cellular context in fixed cells, tissues and animals. b. To provide the infrastructure and expertise to visualize BSL-4 pathogens in their cellular context in fixed cells, tissues, and animals over time. c. To interact and collaborate with NEIDL scientific cores and to provide support to research projects dealing with NIAID category A-C priority pathogens. d. To train core personnel and NEIDL-affiliated researchers in bioimaging techniques.
Imaging of intact, living cell and tissue specimens is critical for understanding the dynamics of cellular processes involved in host-pathogen interactions. Pathogen attachment to host cells, pathogen entry, intracellular trafficking, pathogen development and propagation and the role of regulatory molecules are all best addressed with the aid of these imaging techniques that are essential platforms within NEIDL.
|LeDuc, James W; Anderson, Kevin; Bloom, Marshall E et al. (2009) Potential impact of a 2-person security rule on BioSafety Level 4 laboratory workers. Emerg Infect Dis 15:e1|