While scholars have made significant advances in the last decade in the study of civil wars, they have not yet explained an important puzzle. Why do the longest insurgencies display low levels of violence? Why do many of these durable but small-scale conflicts occur in relatively capable states, such as India, Indonesia, Burma and Colombia, which could eliminate the rebels if they put all their effort into counterinsurgency? Why do these states tolerate these rebel groups as long as they use low-scale violence? The project moves beyond the usual explanations based on commitment or information problems, low state capacity, or regime type, and focuses on state motivations to explain why the longest insurgencies remain at low levels of violence. The project contends that certain developing states prefer not to put all their efforts into state penetration and state formation, and are willing to accept low stateness in certain areas. If rebels locate themselves in these areas of low stateness, these relatively strong states are willing to tolerate these rebel groups as long as violence remains below a threshold and does not threaten the political leaders.
The project tests its argument using a multiple level, nested analysis research design, which nests a sub-national comparative analysis of one such insurgency within cross-national statistical analysis of all insurgencies. The cross-national analysis shows that medium-capacity states with multiple insurgencies tend to have the longest insurgencies. The project examines one such medium capacity state with multiple insurgencies-India-and conducts a sub-national comparative analysis on the small-scale but durable Maoist insurgency, ongoing since 1980. The investigator tests implications of the argument on an events dataset for the Maoist insurgency (covering 2002-2008), created during prior field work and using district-level violence data for all states affected by insurgency. Nested within this all-India quantitative analysis, the researcher carries out a comparative analysis of the patterns of violence and counterinsurgency of two insurgency-affected contiguous states, Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. While in both states the insurgency occurs in areas previously under indirect British rule with low state penetration, the patterns of counterinsurgency and violence are completely different for the two states. While Andhra Pradesh started serious counterinsurgency in the late 1980s, Chhattisgarh escalated counterinsurgency only in 2005. Using data gathered during field work, the investigator demonstrates that variation in threat perception by politicians from the insurgency explains variation in patterns of violence. This finding supports the broader argument that state motivations explain the low violence patterns of these durable insurgencies.
The project's intellectual merit lies in its emphasis on the need to incorporate elected officials and state employees, at distinct levels of government, into the analysis of conflict intensity and duration. The project also creates the first events dataset on any insurgency in India, thus making a major empirical contribution. That such a revolutionary insurgency recruiting from lower castes and tribes can actually co-exist with democratic institutions in the world's largest democracy should interest scholars of democracy, analysts of political violence, and development economists interested in the links between ethnicity, distribution of public goods, and conflict.
The broader impacts of the project stem from the fact that while these low-scale enduring conflicts do not lead to high annual fatality counts, their persistence leads to high human security costs in terms of health, education and environmental costs at the local level. The research is of high policy importance, since the Maoist insurgency has recently escalated and poses a grave security threat. The study of the origins of the insurgency may help policy makers understand how to improve local conditions in the areas with Maoist conflict. The project should also enhance understanding of choices of counterinsurgency measures. It will tell the story of underprivileged groups in Indian society and a war that until recently was hidden, and thus promises to increase awareness both in the international policy community and in the Indian urban milieu.
? PI: Steven Wilkinson Awardee: Yale University This project, conducted by Shivaji Mukherjee, is the best available analysis of the most important and long-running insurgency in India, which affects roughly 20% of the country and has been going on in some form since the late 1960s. The project is important empirically, for understanding the threats to one of the world’s major democracies and a US ally. It is also important theoretically, in helping us to understand why some insurgencies persist even in apparently strong states. The grant supported the collection of some important new data on Naxal insurgencies and their possible causes, including a national database of all conflicts, and detailed data on the two states of Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh. It also supported field work and interviews in India, and an extended period of writing and analysis. The most important results from the research have been presented at a variety of national conferences and at places like MIT and the University of Toronto, and are already making an impact in policy circles. Briefly, the main finding is that colonial patterns of state-building have profoundly affected the opportunity structures for rebels today. Where the colonial state in India practiced indirect rule before 1947, through local ‘princes’ and intermediaries, the capacity of the state is weaker and the capacity of the rebels to sustain large-scale violence is greater. This is despite the fact that the Indian state has tried, since 1947, to adopt similar administrative practices across the country. The finding controls, very effectively, for other possible causes of conflict, as well as possible concerns that the finding that indirect ruleà insurgency might be related to the fact that the colonial state might have introduced indirect rule in areas that were more violence to begin with. This finding about the importance of indirect rule and colonial inheritances is an important corrective to the existing civil war literature, which focuses on factors such as economic grievance, geography, and ethnicity but pays less attention to the historical legacies which affect mobilization and violence.
