In political philosophy, the provision of essential services has been treated as the basis for an implicit contract between states and citizens. According to these theories, the state's reliance on citizens for tax revenue gives governments an incentive to promote citizen welfare by providing public services, while the reliance of citizens on the state for services such as healthcare and primary education gives citizens an incentive to monitor government performance and punish politicians for under-performance. One implication of these theories is that the availability of alternative services provided by non-state actors is likely to disrupt this relationship and undermine political accountability. The impact of non-state services on domestic politics has gained renewed relevance due to the rise of development NGOs. This project develops and tests a theory of the political economy of NGO service provision in developing countries using new and novel data on NGO service delivery and citizen political behavior. Specifically, it examines whether NGO service provision causes citizens to invest fewer resources in political engagement with government, allows governments to garner political benefits such as increased electoral support, and encourages governments to retrench their role in service delivery. The findings have implications for development aid policy, effective philanthropy practices, and social policy in developing countries.

According to some theories from political philosophy, the state's reliance on citizens for tax revenue gives governments an incentive to promote citizen welfare by providing public services, while the reliance of citizens on the state for essential services gives citizens an incentive to monitor government performance and sanction under-performance. One implication of these theories is that the availability of substitutes for government-provided services is likely to disrupt this relationship. Although there is a long history of non-state service provision in both developed and developing countries, the impact of these actors on domestic politics has gained renewed relevance due to the rise of development NGOs. This project develops and tests a theory of the political economy of NGO service provision in developing countries. Specifically, it asks whether NGO service provision causes citizens to invest fewer resources in political engagement with government, allows governments to garner political benefits such as increased electoral support, and encourages governments to retrench their role in service delivery. To test these hypotheses, new and novel data, including spatial data on aid, protests, election returns, public opinion surveys, government budget data, and an original spatial dataset of all health facilities in Uganda over a ten-year period (developed in partnership with the Uganda Bureau of Statistics) is leveraged. To bolster a causal interpretation, the impact of a randomized NGO health intervention on the political attitudes and behavior of citizens in treatment and control communities is evaluated.

This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

Agency
National Science Foundation (NSF)
Institute
Division of Social and Economic Sciences (SES)
Type
Standard Grant (Standard)
Application #
1747642
Program Officer
Brian Humes
Project Start
Project End
Budget Start
2018-08-15
Budget End
2020-07-31
Support Year
Fiscal Year
2017
Total Cost
$14,996
Indirect Cost
Name
University of Pennsylvania
Department
Type
DUNS #
City
Philadelphia
State
PA
Country
United States
Zip Code
19104