Security breaches in computing systems cost billions of dollars in economic damages every year, and the intangible destructive consequences left by malicious attacks are inestimable. Meanwhile, near-threshold computing (NTC) emerges as a promising solution to improve energy efficiency by reducing the supply voltage, making it attractive for a broad range of applications from Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices to cloud computing facilities. With the anticipated adoption of NTC in mainstream computing systems, security vulnerabilities that are unique to NTC will be ripe for exploitation. The objective of this project is to, for the first time, address NTC security concerns by performing a thorough and systematic investigation of its unique vulnerabilities to Side-Channel Attack (SCA) - attacks that rely on information leaked from the physical implementation of a cryptosystem. Side-channel attacks are perhaps one of the most covert and sophisticated among cyber threats.
Instead of treating security as an after-thought in traditional hardware development, in this project, we explore early-stage preventative methods to identify secure concerns in the design phase across different hardware implementation layers, and investigate the fundamental trade-off between efficiency and security in computing systems. Our investigation of the security implications of NTC will provide critical insights and methodologies for designing future efficient and secure computing systems. Due to its multi-disciplinary nature, our research project will promote the development and training of a strong workforce well-versed in the critical security domain across circuit design, computer architecture, and cryptography.
