In modern multistage manufacturing systems, with increased software-defined automation and control as well as monitoring of manufacturing assets across networks, exposure to cyber-attacks also grows. The cyber-threats may compromise the integrity of manufacturing assets (manufacturing systems and processes, machine tools, fabricated parts), reduce manufacturing productivity, and increase costs. Some cyber-threats including integrity attacks are only partially observable in cyberspace alone, and therefore need to be detected and diagnosed through inter-dependency analysis of both cyber and physical signals. Thus, there is a significant opportunity in exploring physical signals, together with cyber signals, to advance trustworthy manufacturing system research and design.

This project brings together leading researchers from manufacturing systems, computer security, and electrical drives to develop and demonstrate a new methodology and tool for cyber-threat detection and diagnosis in multistage manufacturing systems. The cyber-security tool will monitor a variety of cyber and physical signals and perform cyber-threat detection and root cause diagnosis through advanced cyber-physical data fusion and taint analysis. The goal is to enable the prevention and mitigation of potential harms at the early stage, proactive and predictive maintenance, and countermeasures. This project attempts to integrate and analyze the process and quality signals, and the signals from the power networks and cyber networks of multistage manufacturing systems to detect and diagnose cyber-threats. This new systematic approach expects to capture new cyber-threats, especially data integrity attacks, that traditional cyber-security approaches may not capture. The proposed data analytics and methodology for integrating cyber and physical signals will advance a fundamental understanding of cyber-threat detection and diagnosis in multistage manufacturing systems and can broadly apply to other cyber-physical systems.

This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

Agency
National Science Foundation (NSF)
Institute
Division of Computer and Network Systems (CNS)
Type
Standard Grant (Standard)
Application #
2019311
Program Officer
Phillip Regalia
Project Start
Project End
Budget Start
2020-10-01
Budget End
2024-09-30
Support Year
Fiscal Year
2020
Total Cost
$599,976
Indirect Cost
Name
University of Georgia
Department
Type
DUNS #
City
Athens
State
GA
Country
United States
Zip Code
30602