This project examines whether electoral commissions and tribunals can reduce the risk of electoral violence in new democracies. Research in procedural justice shows that individuals will accept outcomes they perceive as unfair as long as the procedure is perceived as fair. The project hypothesizes that those who lose elections are likely to accept the results and refrain from using violence as long as competent and independent election commissions and tribunals exist to legitimize elections and guarantee that today's losers can compete in tomorrow's elections. These arguments are tested in comparative case studies and statistical analyses.
Intellectual Merit: This project makes four important contributions. First, by focusing on institutions that secure free and fair elections (i.e., electoral management bodies or EMBs), this project examines institutions that may be critical to democracy. Second, by focusing on electoral governance and the institutionalization of procedural certainty, the research suggests new solutions to well-known problems of democratic instability in plural societies. Third, by examining EMBs as institutions that limit the incumbent's power, this project challenges the idea that democracy is a credible commitment by elites to redistribute wealth in exchange for the masses' quiescence. Rather, elections in new democracies produce a credible commitment problem and that EMBs can help overcome this problem and so ensure peaceful elections. Finally, this project contributes to the civil war literature by explaining why some democratic transitions turn violent while others do not. The argument is assessed through case studies of Ghana and Kenya, as well as a cross-national statistical analysis of all elections in sub-Sahara Africa between 1990 and 2010.
Broader Impact: This research will have broader impacts in at least three ways. First, by examining different types of electoral management bodies and their effects on people's perceptions about the fairness of elections, this research can help policymakers, donor organizations and NGOs design electoral management bodies which can improve electoral governance in new democracies, and thus reduce the likelihood of electoral violence. Second, the research can also help election observers better understand how citizens evaluate elections and as such, the results from this research can be used to educate future election observers about what citizens find most important when they evaluate the fairness of an election. Third, by collecting data on both electoral management bodies and electoral violence, this project will benefit scholars who study elections and electoral institutions as well as those who focus mainly on political violence.
My dissertation shows that elections are credible commitment problems in which candidates running for election face incentives to use fraud and or violence to win the election. The incentives to subvert the electoral process increase when previously marginalized groups select competitive candidates to compete in the election. However, independent EMBs can resolve the commitment problem by convincing candidates and their supporters that a loss at the polls today does not mean a loss of power forever. In addition, an independent EMB limits the opportunity for election rigging, making it harder to subvert the electoral process,. The project makes several important contributions. First, by focusing on institutions that secure free and fair elections (i.e. electoral management bodies or EMBs), this project examines institutions that may be critical to democracy but that political science has largely ignored. Second, by focusing on electoral governance and the institutionalization of procedural certainty, I suggest new solutions to well-known problems of democratic instability in plural societies. Third, by examining EMBs as institutions that limit the incumbent’s power, this project challenges the idea that democracy is a credible commitment by elites to redistribute wealth in exchange for the masses’ quiescence. Rather, I show that elections in new democracies produce a credible commitment problem and that independent EMBs can help overcome this problem and so insure peaceful elections. The project has broader impacts in at least three ways. First, by examining different types of electoral management bodies and their effects on perceptions about the fairness of elections, this research can help policymakers, donor organizations and NGOs design electoral management bodies which can improve electoral governance in new democracies, and thus reduce the likelihood of electoral violence. Second, this research can help election observers better understand how citizens evaluate elections and as such, can be used to educate future election observers about what citizens find most important when they evaluate the fairness of an election. Third, by collecting data on both electoral management bodies and electoral violence, this project will benefit scholars who study elections, electoral institutions, and political violence.
