Under the terms of Grant Award UC6 AI58618 to construct a National Biocontainment Laboratory at Boston University we will build a safe, secure facility which incorporates all of the components necessary to support cutting edge basic, translational and clinical research on emerging infectious diseases including category A, B and C agents and which is integrated into the vibrant biomedical research and emergency preparedness environments of Boston University Medical Campus, the City of Boston, the region and the nation. We will also put into place comprehensive research, development and training programs which include all the necessary components to achieve the objectives of the NIAID's Strategic Plan for Biodefense Research emphasizing research and the development of diagnostic, preventative and therapeutic products to protect the population of the United States and the world against these agents. The National Biocontainment Laboratory (NBL) at Boston University will be known as the National Emerging Infectious Diseases Laboratories (NEIDL) Institute. The NEIDL Institute will be owned, operated and managed by a consortium of Boston University (BU) and Boston Medical Center (BMC). The NEIDL will be housed at the Boston University Medical Campus (see locus plan). Program activities may also be based at the Charles River Campus of Boston University and at offsite locations as appropriate.

Agency
National Institute of Health (NIH)
Institute
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID)
Type
National Biocontainment Laboratory Operation Cooperative Agreement (UC7)
Project #
3UC7AI070088-05S1
Application #
8307631
Study Section
Special Emphasis Panel (ZAI1-RCG-M (M1))
Project Start
2011-06-20
Project End
2014-04-30
Budget Start
2011-06-20
Budget End
2013-04-30
Support Year
5
Fiscal Year
2011
Total Cost
$147,506
Indirect Cost
Name
Boston University
Department
Type
DUNS #
604483045
City
Boston
State
MA
Country
United States
Zip Code
02118
LeDuc, James W; Anderson, Kevin; Bloom, Marshall E et al. (2009) Potential impact of a 2-person security rule on BioSafety Level 4 laboratory workers. Emerg Infect Dis 15:e1