Primates are highly social animals with large brains and advanced levels of intelligence. Previous comparative studies of primate intelligence have overlooked the social dimension of cognition, and have instead focused on highly repetitive problem-solving tasks. Recently, some researchers have proposed that certain forms of social intelligence, related to the attribution of intent and purpose, may be limited to the great apes and humans. If these speculations turn out to be correct, many ideas concerning the social function of intelligence and the emergence of complex forms of social skills in the earliest humans will need to be revised. In this study a series of experiments will evaluate the proposition that chimpanzees use their own experiences to infer the experiences of others and attribute intent and responsibility to others, whereas rhesus monkeys do not. The research will offer important clues about cognitive capacities linked to food sharing, complex social roles, and non-material aspects of human culture. More importantly, it will provide a critical test of the existing model which postulates that self-awareness exists, not in monkeys, but only in humans and in the higher anthropoids most closely related to humans.
