Routing protocols enable a distributed set of nodes to determine the flow of data over important networks such as the Internet. As a result, ensuring that nodes throughout the network properly implement the routing-protocol is of paramount importance. The routing-protocols in these networks are distributed, and nodes operate independently, but must cooperate and "play by the rules" of the routing protocol if the network is to function correctly and efficiently. Routing protocols form the basis of what is called the "control plane" of a networking architecture.
This project focuses on the control plane, and is seeking to further development of a methodology for measuring the inherent security of the control plane component of existing and future routing protocols. The overall approach has a significant theoretical component: general classes of routing protocols are identified and they are being analyzed for their ability to monitor themselves. The technique of Strong Detection is being used to reveal bounds on the kinds of errors that these classes of routing protocols can detect, thus identifying complexity classes of routing protocols in terms of their self-monitoring abilities.
The work in this project contributes to an entirely new way of evaluating the security level of a routing protocol. Strong Detection is novel, not only in its ability to identify the existence of a control plane attack, but also in its ability to classify the robustness to attack of classes of routing protocols. The project will contribute to the general area of routing security, which is necessary to protect our networking infrastructure from deliberate or accidental damage.
