A smart grid system is complicated because it combines new and old technologies and is dependent on different cyber and physical components. Because it is complicated, a smart grid is more likely to be attacked due to misconfigurations and lacking security measures. Therefore, the secure and resilient operation of smart grids must be ensured by identifying potential threats and their impact and finding affordable solutions to defend against identified threats. This research aims to achieve these goals through the development of an efficient security analysis framework for the Energy Management System (EMS), a core smart grid component.
The intellectual merit of the proposed research lies in advancing the science of security analysis for Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) by integrating different theories, such as formal verification, model simulation, data and control flow, and security concepts, into the CPS components. This work will contribute to the CPS security science by: (a) developing a comprehensive formal model for stealthy attack verifications and (b) designing an efficient mechanism for systematically performing the impact-oriented threat analysis. Although this research targets EMS in smart grids, the approach is broad enough to be generalized for other CPS control loops that utilize measurement-based estimation.
CPS, like power grids, are critical to the national infrastructure, requiring that they be secure and dependable, especially with the increase of cyberwarfare. This research aims to address the urgent need to analyze CPS security. In addition to the technical project contributions, graduate and undergraduate level course modules on CPS security will also be developed. Underrepresented and minority students will be encouraged, through local and outreach activities, to participate in the project. Results of this project will be widely publicized in the research community through peer-reviewed journals articles and conference papers.
