Professor Field's first goal in this project is to clarify the content and methodological function of the doctrine of physicalism. This doctrine has played an important methodological role in guiding science, but exactly how to formulate it is a difficult question. It is also an important one, not only because of the importance of understanding this aspect of scientific methodology for its own sake but also because the answer one gives to it makes a real difference to how one approaches certain subjects. One of the more difficult subjects which philosophers consider is intentional psychology whose status and methods are very much in dispute. A related goal for Professor Field is to clarify the explanatory role of talk content or truth conditions in intentional psychology. There appear to be some difficulties in achieving for intentional psychology the same high physicalist standards that we demand for other sciences. So Professor Field will examine whether the explanatory role of content or truth conditions might be so different from the role of the typical notions of the other special sciences that those high standards might be inappropriate to content or truth conditions. Even if the answer is 'no', the investigation should shed light on how to reconcile intentional psychology with physicalism. If that can be done, it will remove the motive that some have had for trying to do without the use of intentional talk in psychological explanation.
