9453182 McAdams The primary hypothesis of this Policy Study is that access to networked resources, such as those available through the Internet, is essential to reform of science and math education. From participation at recent conferences on the National Information Infrastructure (NII), the Principal Investigator (PI) has concluded that schemes being seriously considered for pricing the Internet could effectively foreclose the Internet as a resource to the K-12 community. On the other hand, little attention has been given in policy circles to the consortium and asymmetric pricing (a "price" of zero to the users; e.g., K-12 educators and students; and a positive price to the producers, sufficient to get the good or service produced, and to keep the producers in business). The consortium can permit asymmetric pricing of goods with the characteristics of economic public goods (see below). In Part One of the Study the PI proposes a collaborative analysis to be undertaken jointly with Staff Members from NSF;s Education and Human Resources (EHR) Program. The objective is to gather evidence to test the primary hypothesis; it is to be an overall review of the likely effectiveness of the resources committed to reform of K-12 Math and Science Education, given the economic market structures faced in this arena. It will involve an assessment of those projects that have been highly successful, and those that have not lived up to their promise. Special emphasis will be given to the role of networked resources in each instance. In Part Two of the Study, the PI proposes to make an evaluation of the consortium as a tool to create, and/or permit asymmetric pricing for innovative products and services, including, but not limited to, the internet. The working hypothesis is that consortia represent a mechanism through which pricing schemes appropriate to K-12 can be implemented, while assuring that required goods and services are produced. The consortium has not been w ell studied, however; nor is it well understood. Part Two of the study is focused on several important consortia, each case with its own history and approach. Such case studies are required as a step toward understanding the capabilities and limitations of the consortium as an institution of efficient resource allocation. In Part Three the PI will prepare policy papers relating to pricing schemes appropriate to the economic market situation faced by K--12 and by suppliers to this and similar markets that approximate the characteristics of economic public goods. An economic public good is neither depletable nor excludable: its use by one party does not diminish its availability to others; its availability to one, means that it is available to all. These characteristics imply that there is no cost to society for supplying the good to the next user; in economic terms, its marginal cost is zero. Efficient resource allocation requires price to equal marginal cost; price to the user must be zero. But to get the good produced requires a price equal to cost, including a "normal return" on investment. This requires asymmetric pricing: zero price to the user; positive price to the producer. In turn, this suggests the use of consortia. ***
