This dissertation analyzes the relationship between economic globalization and democratic governance in affluent capitalist societies. The extant literature on this subject yields contradictory hypotheses. Some scholars argue that globalization, by undermining the autonomy of the nation-state and enhancing the political power of transnational corporations, has weakened the ability of national democratic systems to produce a genuine class compromise. Other scholars disagree. They argue that, at least for the affluent capitalist countries, the social and political effects of globalization have been significantly overstated. Drawing on this debate and the literature on comparative political systems and welfare states, this dissertation hypothesizes that the structure of a country's political system, not its level of global market integration, decisively affects many social and political patterns associated with class compromise. A structural equation model, using six proxies to measure democratic class compromise, and data from 16 OECD counties are used to test this hypothesis and related propositions. The results will make two important contributions to sociology. First, they will help clarify debates within the globalization literature, and second they will demonstrate a novel approach to studying political power within democratic societies.
