This award will fund work in game theory. The major goal is to develop alternatives to the widely-used concept of Nash equilibrium. This concept and its refinements are the basis for most applications of game theory, yet it is still not clear what predictions to make in games with multiple Nash equilibriua, nor just what equilibrium concept is appropriate in games whose strategies correspond to contingent plans, as opposed to an uncontingent choice of an action.
The starting point for this project is that equilibria in games arise as the long-run outcome of a non-equilibrium dynamic process of learning, imitation, or evolution. The project has two components. In the first, the PI will model rational learning by patient, long-lived individuals and will analyze what happens when these individuals interact with a succession of anonymous opponents. The second part will fous on the role of evolution or imitation as a dynamic process. Here individuals will imitate the behavior of successful players (or animals genetically programmed to play a successful strategy will have higher reproductive success). The major goal is to determine what will happen in a large but finite population of these individuals.
This project will combine recent advances in economics with work in mathematical biology. The results will be of interest to scholars in many fields that use game theory, including political science, sociology, computer science, and psychology.
This award is made as part of the FY 2004 Human and Social Dynamics (HSD) portfolio, following a competition that involved participation from all NSF Directorates and Offices. HSD awards are administered through specific programs that may change during the award period; management of all HSD awards is coordinated on an NSF-wide basis.
