Models of negotiator decision making typically assume that each side is an individual, but important negotiations are often conducted by groups. Differences in group members' preferences, motives and information can all contribute to serious within-group conflicts, which can in turn threaten the success of between-group negotiations. While there have been plenty of instances in which within-group conflict has led to failures of governmental, union or corporate negotiations, we do not as yet understand systematically how intragroup conflicts threaten intergroup negotiation outcomes.
How do within-group processes affect between-group negotiations -- and vice-versa? This project seeks to answer these questions by testing hypotheses about negotiator aspirations, motives, and information processes in groups in intergroup negotiation. It also explores the impact of such group-level phenomena as status contests, autocratic versus democratic group leadership, within-group disagreement, and diversity of cultural values. The experiments use a unique combination of two laboratory paradigms, bilateral integrative bargaining (multiple-issue tasks that allow a range of possible agreements) and public good social dilemmas (which relates to individuals' inclinations to cooperate with their groups). The results should have practical implications for intergroup negotiations in many contexts, including within and between governments and organizations.
