Over the last ten years a large literature has developed looking at the implications of asymmetric information and strategic voting in simple models of elections. Up to now the central questions have focused on the manner in which different electoral rules aggregate information or contribute to an incentive to abstain from voting. However, the question of how voters come to be asymmetrically informed has been largely unexplored. Of particular interest, particularly in the context of small committees is the question of the effects of communication among voters prior to voting, i.e. deliberation.
Strategic communication prior to voting creates an additional level of complexity in that voters must be concerned not only about the circumstances under which their vote is pivotal, but also about the circumstances under which their public statements are pivotal. Incorporating both sorts of consideration in turn leads to a need for committee members to be sensitive to interactions between voting and speaking.
The PIs will explore such interactions between deliberation and voting using strategic (game-theoretic) models of communication with incomplete information. The research will identify institutional arrangements regarding voting (for instance, using majority or unanimity voting) and debate (for instance, how committee decisions and deliberation are affected by the order in which individuals speak or the constraints on what can be said) that best promote informed and efficient communication and collective decision-making. Communication and debate are considered important aspects of collective choice, both at the committee and the electoral level, yet implications for the character of debate and collective decisions of alternative institutional arrangements for communication and voting are very little understood. Results from the project should improve our understanding of the issues and thus inform substantive discussions on the role of deliberation in collective choice.
