It is widely believed that an independent judiciary fosters economic development, low corruption levels, protection for human rights, and a host of other societal goods. Empirical analysis, however, do not find consistent evidence that "judicial independence" causes those benefits. This project provides a better understanding of what judicial independence means, in order to be able to tell it when we see it, and to evaluate what difference does it make, on what, and under what circumstances. The project is composed of a theoretical analysis followed by an empirical study on seventeen Latin American countries, as well as two case studies in Chile and Mexico. The PI will derive an original framework to analyze judicial independence. In particular, he will identify and rank different institutional models of judicial independence, i.e. different possible ways of organizing the judicial system of a country. From there, the PI will propose a set of observable variables and classify Latin American countries according to their model. We argue that this classification not only allow us to make meaningful comparisons across time and space but also to test for the effects of different dimensions of judicial independence on governance and prosperity issues. In addition, the project involves creating a database with legal variables, behavioral data to validate the de jure classification, as well as data on corruption, human rights protection, access to justice, and prosperity issues. The broader impacts of the proposal lie in the identification of which particular dimensions of judicial independence are good to combat corruption, protect human rights, and promote prosperity. This award was co-funded by NSF's Office of International Science and Engineering.
