The Best Judges Money Can Buy? Campaign Contributions and the Texas Supreme Court
The cost of campaigning has grown tremendously, especially for those candidates running for positions on state high courts. Along with this trend, many have been quick to note that lawyers and corporate interests have been contributing to these candidates at unprecedented levels. In 2000, state supreme court candidates raised a record $45 million. Critics of judicial campaign contributions maintain that judges should be guided in their decisions by the law alone; they should not be unduly influenced by litigants, interest groups, and lawyers who contribute to their campaigns (Justice at Stake Campaign 2002; 2004; Texans for Public Justice 1998; 2001). Others argue that contributors are participating in the established selection process and that it is difficult to show that contributions have an effect on judicial decisions (Schotland, Cheek, and Champagne 2001).
This debate regarding the effect of campaign contributions on judicial decisions provides the starting point for the present study. We propose to analyze cases decided by the Texas Supreme Court from 1990 through 2000. Texas is an ideal setting for the study because it has been the scene of some of the most expensive and hard-fought judicial campaigns; other states are now going through similar experiences (Cheek and Champagne 2005; Justice at Stake Campaign 2004). We will examine three key aspects of state supreme court decision making: the decision to accept (or reject) a case for review; the court's decision on the merits; and individual justices' votes. Most studies provide an incomplete picture of state supreme court decision making because they fail to take into account the case selection process (Brace, Hall, and Langer 2001). Our study will analyze approximately 6,500 petitions for review; 1,100 case decisions; and over 9,000 individual votes. We will develop comprehensive explanatory models for all three phases of judicial decision making; including variables to measure judicial ideology, the political environment, case issues, litigant status, attorney experience, and law firm size. These observations will then be merged with data on campaign contributions by litigants, attorneys, law firms, and interest groups for both appellants and respondents. We plan to apply advanced statistical techniques to the questions at hand, including the use of sample selection techniques to model both docket access and case outcomes simultaneously. In addition, we will also control for potential endogeneity issues by utilizing instruments for the campaign finance measures employed.
Intellectual Merit: The intellectual merit of the proposed study is substantial for four reasons. First, it is one of the few studies that will examine all three aspects of judicial decision making, including case selection, court decisions, and individual justices' votes. Second, the research setting, Texas, is a bellwether state; the findings will apply to many other states. Third, the proposed study will involve a number of justices and encompass an extended time frame characterized by a great deal of partisan and ideological change. Moreover, the study will include a larger number of petitions, case decisions, and individual justices' votes than any previous study examining the effect of campaign contributions on judicial decisions. Finally, the proposed study will develop more comprehensive models in an effort to provide a more complete explanation for the role of campaign contributions in judicial decision making than those found in prior research.
Broader Impact: The broader impact of the proposed study is multi-faceted. First, it will provide new information for presentation in judicial politics, state politics, and Texas politics courses. Second, it will provide an opportunity for students at the University of Georgia and UT-Permian Basin to learn about research through direct participation in the research process. The impact will be especially dramatic at UTPB, a Hispanic serving institution with limited exposure to research supported by the National Science Foundation. Finally, our study will provide additional information on current debates over the use of partisan election as the means for choosing judges (Cheek and Champagne 2000; 2005). Building on the findings of prior research, our study offers a new, more rigorous empirical test of a direct linkage between the interests associated with judicial campaign contributions and subsequent behavior of judges who received those campaign contributions.
