Auctions, contract theory, and dynamics have become the leading and modern tools of analysis in modern economic inquiry. These developments are in their infancy and not generally understood by many in the economics profession. New developments, extensions, and applications are therefore needed to broaden and deepen the influence of these theories in the economics profession. This research is an accomplishment-based renewal for a program of theoretical research in the areas of dynamics, auctions, and voting. In dynamics, the questions posed bear on (A) Markov perfect equilibrium, where the results should prove useful to the many applied researchers who use this equilibrium concept in their work; (B) unforeseen contingencies, where the research should be of interest to those working on the foundations of contract theory and, more generally, the foundations of decision theory; (C) hyperbolic discounting, where the proposed work should contribute to the literatures on the boundaries between economics, biology, and psychology; and (D) the soft budget constraint, where the findings should have significance not only for academic researchers but for those involved in designing policy for the transformation of centralized economies to decentralized systems. The questions posed under the heading of auction theory should be of interest not only to the large community of auction theorists, but also to those wishing to design auctions for such purposes as privatization and pollution reduction. Finally, the work to be done under voting should be helpful not only to political economists and political scientists, but also to those envisaging reform of electoral systems. The results of this research project should contribute significantly to economic science as well as other social sciences, such as political science. A broader impact is that the theories developed are applicable across several disciplines. The proposed research makes a strong case for accomplishment based renewal.
