This dissertation research seeks to be the definitive study of legislative vetoes as important congressional oversight devices. While the legislative veto has existed as an institutional oversight mechanism for over 75 years, it has received sparingly little scholarly attention. This lack of scholarship is likely driven in part by the 1983 majority ruling in INS v. Chadha, which declared the legislative veto unconstitutional. Despite this ruling, more legislative vetoes have been enacted after 1983 than were enacted prior to Chadha. Thus, the modern legislative veto serves as an increasingly utilized, yet often overlooked, oversight device that allows Congress to institutionalize forms of both ex ante and ex post control over the agencies to which discretionary policy-making power has been delegated. Accordingly, this research seeks to examine why the legislative veto has persisted as an oversight device and to identify what conditions make legislative vetoes more or less likely. In order to analyze the legislative veto as a versatile oversight resource, the data for this dissertation include (1) an original data set cataloging legislative veto provisions from 1946 to 2006, and (2) interview data from elected officials, committee staff, and administrative officials. The intellectual merit of this project stems largely from its theoretical approach to congressional oversight, which analyzes the legislative veto by integrating two theoretical perspectives. One theoretical approach commonly utilized to study delegation is principal-agent theory. In a system of separated powers when policy-making authority is delegated to administrative agencies, both the legislative and executive branches typically seek to exercise control over eventual bureaucratic policy outputs. Given these dynamics, this research applies a principal-agent theoretical framework with multiple principals to test hypotheses regarding many of principal-agent theory's underlying assumptions. In addition to the application of principal-agent theory with multiple principals, this research also analyzes the legislative veto as an increasingly important context for institutional conflict between the legislative and executive branches. Since the Chadha decision, Congress has continued to include legislative vetoes in legislation, while modern presidents have attempted to block this particular type of oversight by vetoing legislation containing legislative vetoes or by attaching signing statements to laws instructing executive officials to disregard certain statutes. Integrating these theoretical approaches aims to provide a more comprehensive explanation of congressional oversight. Understanding the dynamics of the relationship between Congress and the federal bureaucracy, in particular, congressional delegation of policy-making power and the use and effectiveness of congressional oversight, is critical to explaining an increasingly essential component of modern American governance. Thus, the broader impact of this research serves to advance our understanding of congressional oversight, bureaucratic policy making, and public administration. To this end, a study of the legislative veto as an oversight mechanism is critical to a better conceptualization of how policy-making authority is delegated, overseen, and used to implement public policy.
