In parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, prime ministers play a central role in forming and coordinating governments. The rules that structure competition for the premiership are thus of great importance. Although the following characterization does not fit all cases equally well, it is helpful to think of there being three post-electoral stages in the election of a premier: (1) a nomination stage, in which a constitutionally stipulated actor-whom we shall generically call the "nominator"-chooses a government formateur, typically the presumptive prime minister; (2) a negotiation stage, in which the formateur attempts to form a government; and (3) a ratification stage, in which the assembly either explicitly approves the proposed premier and government (via an investiture vote) or implicitly accepts his or her government (via the failure to pass a no-confidence vote). Regarding the second (negotiation) stage, we note two advantages of being appointed as formateur: first, the formateur typically becomes the prime minister; second, the formateur may secure a bonus for his party, in the form of additional cabinet portfolios (cf. Baron and Ferejohn 1989). The importance of becoming formateur, as an intermediate step to becoming premier and/or securing other desirable portfolios, means that the nominator's choice (in the first stage) is important.
The "nominator" is usually a monarch or a president. Whatever their formal positions, nominators differ along two key dimensions: (a) how clear their partisan preferences are; and (b) how constrained their choice (of who will be formateur) is by constitutional rules and norms. The PIs intend to collect data on the entire government formation process in all parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies from 1990-present. The data include but are not limited to: (1) the partisan affiliation of the nominator; (2) the constitutional constraints the nominator faces; (3) the political opportunities the nominator faces (largely determined by the fragmentation of the party and alliance system); (4) the first appointed formateur, second, third, and so on; (5) the allocation of cabinet portfolios and other offices (e.g., committee chairs) among the various parties; (6) any public announcements made by parties regarding their coalitional intentions in forming a government. Analysis will then proceed of (1) whether nominators are more likely appoint members of their own party as formateur; (2) whether nominators can secure for their parties a bonus share of cabinet portfolios; (3) when and why formateurs are able to secure a bonus share of cabinet portfolios; and (4) how anticipation of nominator effects influences the formation of pre-election alliances and/or mergers to form larger parties.
The intellectual merit of the project lies in its clarification of the bargaining process that structures government formation in parliamentary and semi-presidential regimes, especially highlighting the role of partisan nominators. The broader impact of the project include providing some basis for decisions by political reformers, who in many countries recently have been centrally concerned with re-engineering the government formation process or the party system.
