One of the key regularities of economic development is the gradual expansion of the economic and political rights of women. Historically, women had few political and economic rights in all countries. In Western countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States women's rights were first expanded in the mid-19th century. Today, women in most industrialized countries have acquired the same rights as men. In contrast, women's rights are still lacking in many developing countries. What explains the connection between economic development and women's rights? The project examines the link between development and women's rights from an economic perspective. In particular, the project takes a political-economy approach and identifies the political interests that drive expansions of women's rights. A key observation is that in the United Kingdom and the United States, many of the most significant reforms were introduced long before women obtained the right to vote. In other words, the reforms were passed by all-male legislatures that were responsible only to male voters, so that the initial expansion of women's rights amounted to a voluntary ceding of power on the part of men. This suggests that men came to regard improving the rights of women as being in their own interest. The project develops a political-economy model which can account for the endogenous expansion of women's rights in the course of development. The theory focuses on men's incentives for sharing power with women and suggests that changes in the economic environment led to a situation where both men and women stood to gain from an equalized distribution of rights. In particular, the theory demonstrates that an increase in the demand for human capital can trigger the expansion of women's rights. In turn, the expansion of women's rights further accelerates the accumulation of human capital. The link between economic development and women's rights therefore runs both ways. The underlying mechanism is that granting more power to women leads to increased investments in the education of children. As the demand for human capital increases and the return to skill goes up, men and women alike increasingly desire a high level of education for their descendants. Men therefore come to prefer to share power with women. The broader impact of the research derives from its implications for development policy. A number of studies have identified a lack of women's rights as an important hindrance for successful economic development. Given that it is generally infeasible to impose gender equality on a country from the outside, for successful development policy it is essential to identify conditions under which those in political control will find it advantageous to improve the legal position of women. The work on the political economy of women's rights carried out as part of the project can identify conditions that will facilitate and promote gender equality. For example, the theoretical framework suggests that public measures that are complementary to education within the family (such as public health programs for children and high-quality elementary schools in particular for girls) could increase the support for women's rights. The research also suggests that marriage-market institutions may play a key role in the political economy of women's rights.
One of the key regularities of economic development is the gradual expansion of the economic and political rights of women. Historically, women had few political and economic rights in all countries. In Western countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States women's rights were first expanded in the mid-19th century. Today, women in most industrialized countries have acquired the same rights as men. The aim of this project is to examine the link between development and women's rights from an economic perspective. In particular, the project takes a political-economy approach and identifies the political interests that drive expansions of women's rights. Our analysis starts from the observation is that in the United Kingdom and the United States, many of the most significant reforms were introduced long before women obtained the right to vote. In other words, the reforms were passed by all-male legislatures that were responsible only to male voters, so that the initial expansion of women's rights amounted to a voluntary ceding of power on the part of men. This suggests that men came to regard improving the rights of women as being in their own interest. We develop a political-economy model which can account for the endogenous expansion of women's rights in the course of development. The theory focuses on men's incentives for sharing power with women and suggests that changes in the economic environment led to a situation where both men and women stood to gain from an equalized distribution of rights. In particular, the theory demonstrates that an increase in the demand for human capital can trigger the expansion of women's rights. To be more specific, the idea put forth in the paper is that from a man's perspective, there is a tradeoff between the rights of his own wife versus the rights of other men's wives. Improvements in married women's economic rights increase women's bargaining power relative to their husbands within the household. Since husbands have nothing to gain from an increase in their wives' bargaining power at their own expense, men ideally want their own wives to have no rights. But men might stand to gain from other women having rights. We focus on two channels that give men a stake in the rights of other men's wives. First, men are altruistic towards their own children, half of which are daughters. Men prefer their daughters to have a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis their sons-in-law. Second, in our model an improved bargaining position for wives translates, among other things, into increased investments in children's human capital. A father prefers his children to find high-quality mates, and therefore stands to gain from increasing the power of his children's future mothers-in-law. We argue that this tradeoff between the rights of a man's own wife versus those of other men's wives has shifted over time, because of a changing role of human capital. When the return to education increases, finding well-educated spouses for one's children becomes a more important concern. Similarly, a rising return to education increases fathers' concern about the rights of their daughters, because the daughter's marital bargaining power matters for the grandchildren's education. According to our theory, the ultimate cause of the expansion of women's rights throughout the nineteenth century was technological change that increased the demand for human capital. This change elevated the importance of children's education, it strengthened men's incentives to expand women's bargaining power, and it ultimately induced men to voluntarily extend rights to women. We corroborate our arguments with historical evidence on the expansion of women's economic rights in England and the United States. Our theory places the introduction of women's rights in the context of the demographic transition and the increased accumulation of human capital in the second phase of the industrial revolution. We show that the historical timing of increased investments in education, declining fertility, and the expansion of women's rights is consistent with the implications of our theory. We also show that the historical debates surrounding the major reforms of women's rights during this period reflect the key arguments in our analysis. Based on evidence from parliamentary debates and newspaper editorials, we document that in both England and the United States there was a gradual shift during the nineteenth century from arguments that concentrate on the rights of men towards a view that gives first priority to the needs of children.
