Sentencing guidelines, statutory presumptive sentencing, and determinate sentencing (elimination of discretionary parole boards) are each important parts of the criminal justice system. The main purpose behind a relatively fixed matrix of sentences is to remove judicial discretion by insuring that convicted felons receive implicit prison time depending on the crime committed. Few studies have attempted to systematically answer the question of whether these new "fixed" sentencing procedures or the removal of parole boards produce the outcomes stated by their supporters. The current study assesses the effects on shifts in incarceration rates across all 50 states from the years 1965 to 2007 to determine if the reforms have led to increases in total imprisonment or have other unintended consequences (e.g., increasing disparities among people of color or "widening the net" and bringing in more offenders). The analysis uses Prais-Winston regression with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) and fixed effects for states with controls for crime, demographic and political variables, prison entries, and serial autocorrelation, which supplies more robust results than prior research. The study has implications for both theory and policy. Substantively, the results may indicate reforms significantly increase imprisonment. Functionally, rapid prison growth can be a logistical and financial burden on a state and these results could help shed light onto the specific mechanisms associated with this growth. Furthermore, the results indicate that socio-political mechanisms are at work that "target" historically disadvantaged groups, which may aid in the continuation of inequalities within the criminal justice system. This is of particular concern given that many states have suggested that racial and ethnic disparities should decrease with the limiting of judicial discretion. If results indicate no change or an increase in disparities, despite intentions to reduce them, then states may want to reevaluate their sentencing procedures.
