In democratic settings ranging from Italy to Indonesia, we observe the coexistence of free and fair elections with a large number of allegedly criminal legislators. At the same time, there is a growing concern in many developing democracies that the electoral sphere is increasingly being restricted to a narrow cadre of politicians who boast significant personal wealth. This study considers the interactive effects between money and "muscle" in democratic politics. The project is motivated by the simple puzzle: why are politicians in democracies often rewarded, rather than punished, for their criminal connections.
Taking advantage of a unique source of data, the investigators study the conditions under which candidates accused of criminal misconduct succeed in democratic societies through an examination of India, the world's largest democracy. The study attempts to address four overarching questions. First, why do political parties recruit candidates for office who possess serious criminal indictments, and what role does money play? Second, what impact does alleged criminality have on electoral performance? Third, what explains the motivations of voters in supporting suspected criminal candidates? And finally, what are the consequences of money and "muscle" for the effective functioning of democratic accountability?
The research aims to contribute to our understanding of the relationship between criminals and electoral that is applicable to a diverse range of democratic settings. First, this study provides a unique method of measuring criminality and political corruption that is broadly applicable to a wide range of democratic settings. Second, a better understanding of the role of money in candidate selection adds a previously under-theorized dimension to the literature on political selection. Third, this study aims to contribute to our understanding of the causes and consequences of criminal politicians, namely the underexplored motivations of voters. Indentifying and explaining these motivations can also help policymakers develop policies that could improve the rule of law and democratic effectiveness in India and other electoral democracies.
," contributes to our understanding of how democratic elections can coexist with a significant number of politicians implicated in criminal wrongdoing. Specifically, it provides answers to three questions. Why do parties nominate candidates with criminal backgrounds? Why do voters vote for them? And what does their proliferation mean for democratic accountability? To address these questions, we draw on a wide body of quantitative and qualitative evidence from India, the world’s largest democracy. We argue that parties are attracted to criminal politicians because they have access to financial resources that allow them to function as self-financing candidates. Whereas the prevailing consensus in political economy suggests that voters support "bad politicians" because they lack adequate information on candidate quality, we develop an alternate theory that suggests well-informed voters can display rational behavior by voting for such candidates. Specifically, in contexts where social divisions are highly salient, voters often desire a representative who they perceive can protect group-based interests most credibly. In such settings, criminality can serve as a useful signal of a candidate’s credibility. As a result, parties selectively field criminal candidates in those areas where social divisions are most pronounced. The implications of this study are far reaching because they suggest that information about a candidate’s criminality is not only available, but actually is central to understanding the viability of his candidacy. Thus, there are circumstances in which "bad politicians" can in fact be compatible with democratic accountability. With NSF support, this project has made several important intellectual contributions. Empirically, we have constructed a unique database of affidavits submitted by more than 60,000 candidates contesting state and national elections in India between 2003 and 2009. The dataset is supplemented with additional data from election returns, the national census, and demographic surveys. The complete dataset will be made public for other researchers and private citizens to drawn upon. Furthermore, this unique database offers a template for researchers working on similar issues in other country contexts. With respect to methodology, this study demonstrates the value of combining quantitative analyses with ethnographic and field work—the latter components being especially useful in specifying the causal mechanisms at work. With regards to theory, our project has made at least four signal contributions. First, in contrast to much of the political selection literature, our research provides an affirmative case for the selection of bad politicians in democracies. Second, there is a consensus in political economy that citizens’ access to a free flow of information on political leadership and government performance is vital for improving governance outcomes. Our study demonstrates that, under certain conditions, information may not be a panacea. Third, our project shows that criminality and corruption in politics respond to the incentives of electoral design. Electoral quotas, the direct/indirect nature of elections and other design considerations can alter the tactics of parties and politicians. Finally, our study highlights the relevance of election finance—both its methods and sources—for understanding corruption and criminality in politics. This is an especially pertinent issue for developing democracies given the alleged role that illicit election funds play there. Beyond political science, this study also has ramifications for other disciplines. For instance, this study provides an empirical test of several hypotheses from the economics literature on political selection, which have been argued formally but not extensively tested with data. Second, this study presents systematic data that substantiates many of the arguments from anthropology on the role of corruption and criminality in democratic politics. This project has also had a number of broader outcomes. First, the project has contributed in the training and development of several project personnel. The project worked with several young researchers in India who have an interest in politics and political economy. The project exposed six promising young academics and practitioners to the basics of research design, social science methodology and the comparative political science literature. Second, our findings have entered the scholarly debate in comparative politics. We have presented findings from this research to numerous academic audiences through conferences, and seminars—including through the dissemination of working papers and the co-PI’s dissertation. The co-PI has submitted two articles from this project to top journals in the field of political science, with two more in preparation. The co-PI is also preparing the dissertation into a book manuscript with the goal of publication by an academic press. Beyond the scholarly realm, this project has also influence policy debates in India. We have briefed policymakers, journalists, scholars and practitioners in India on our work. We have also written short, accessible commentaries which summarize our work for a more general audience.
