This project provides a broad-based investigation into the presidential role in the federal grants process. The project examines not only the effects of presidential influence, but the ways in which it occurs. To do so, the investigator examines presidential influence, using original databases of federal grants from 1996-2008. The first part of the project seeks to answer the question "Where do grants go?" The relationship between the competitiveness of elections and the distribution of federal funds is exameined. This analysis evaluates whether states that are competitivie in presidential elections-swing states-receive more grants. The second part of the project examines whether swing states receive more federal funds druing distinct time periods, specifically as presidential elections draw near. This section seeks to provide a more complete understanding of presidential influence in the context of elections. Third, because some federal agencies are more open to political influence, the investigator examines how agency design and the number of political appointees within agencies affects the manner in which grants are allocated. Finally, the investigator conducts interviews where responses from bureaucrats, interest group lobbyists and state officials are used to evaluate the mechanisms of executive branch influence in the grants process.
The broader impact of the results will significantly advance our understanding of federalism, presidential elections, presidential control of the bureaucracy, and the influences and political pressures in the federal grant process. This research provides a more complete understanding of the intersection of politics and policy in a manner that exposes its impact on the lives of every American. Becasue individuals, companies, schools, hospitals, state agencies, and thousands of research facilities count on federal grants to provide services and information and advance knowledge, this study seeks to offer insight into a system that broadly affects society on a daily basis. Through a comprehensinve analysis of the federal grants process and the external influences and pressures that influence public policy, this project will increase knowledge in the fields of political science and public administration.
This research looks inside the American bureaucracy to understand how presidents use mechanisms of administrative control to advance their electoral interests. Specifically, this project show that presidents influence the distribution of federal grants by targeting the to swing states, particularly in advance of election. This portion of the research conducted as part of this dissertation improvement grant involved original elite interviews with federal and state bureaucrats and interest group lobbyists all intimately involved in the federal grants process. Through these interviews, I gained a thorough understanding of the precise means by which presidents influence grants. This includes pervasive decision making power among appointees; OMB oversight; and the manipulation of evaluation procedures, grant program designs, and eligibility criteria. While presidential influence is at the margins--not a strategy affecting every federal dollar--respondents were clear in explaining presidential electoral interests become a regular part of the administration of grants. The funds from NSF also allowed a unique sample design for elite interviewing in the executive branch. I diversified the sample across three groups of individuals who were involved in the federal grants process in entirely unique ways. The focus on grant suppliers (federal bureaucrats), grant demanders (state bureaucrats) and intermediaries (interest group officials) allowed different perspectives that helped overcomes some of the challenges facing elite interviews including distortion. The project offers new inside into theories of presidential motives and behavior as well as political control. I argue that presidents are primarily driven by electoral interests and use the powers of their office to advance such interests. Further, I assert that the complex nature of the institutional presidency offers presidents an army of loyal and responsive agents who effectively allow them the ability to affect policy even at the micro-level.
