When and why do legislators seek reforms to empower or restrict the national judiciary, and what makes these efforts successful? Judicial independence is an oft cited "top priority" to democracy advocates around the globe, yet very little is known about how an independent judiciary is viewed or valued by political elites, or how broder patterns of political competition implicate judicial institutions and inter-branch exchange. This project is a novel approach to understanding this phenomenon by explicitly attending to micro-level political incentives elected officials face when deciding to restrict or empower a national judiciary.
This research interprets judicial reform proposals as a "position-taking" opportunity for elected officials, advanced by elites for their own electoral gain. Interpreting inter-branch engagement in this way - rooting it squarely in a strategic profile of ambitious elected officials - offers a novel way to theorize relations between legislative and judicial institutions. The investigator extends this notion of position-taking as one which can be understood with reference to electoral incentives to explore this phenomenon cross-nationally. Specifically, the research anticipates observable consequences in the frequency of, justification for, and likelihood of eventual adoption of judicial reforms on the basis of electoral institutions and political incentives. Where institutions incentivize legislators to differentiate themselves from their party's platform, the research expects reform proposals to be more frequent, to be justified in terms of specific policy outcomes, but will only rarely constitute a credible threat to fundamentally altering judicial institutions. Cross-national and time-serial variation of electoral institutions and public confidence in the judiciary provide an optimal testing ground for these hypotheses.
This research will contribute to our understanding of the political basis of judicial activism and independence by situating courts in larger arena of political conflict and competition. An independent judiciary - one that is impervious to external political influence - is seen as a critical locus for the promotion of human rights, the property rights necessary for economic development and the entrenchment of the rule of law. By first understanding how political elites seek to shape judicial institutions for their own political gain and what makes them successful in doing so, we can begin to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for increased judicial influence and participation.
Describe the major research and education activities of the project. Separation of powers theorists in the United States have long pondered the basis of "court curbing," questioning when and why legislators threaten the autonomy of an independent court. Recently, these proposals have been cast as "position taking" opportunities for elected officials: strategic signals sent by ambitious politicians seeking to improve their own electoral fortune. In her dissertation, co-PI Driscoll theorized observable consequences in the the frequency, justification and shared responsibility for inter-branch attacks on the basis of electoral incentives. Specifically, she hypothesized that legislators' interest in judicial independence stems from proximate electoral considerations, brought a by electoral institutions, political competition, and public regard for national courts. To test this theory, she compiled and analyzed a new data-set of court curbing initiatives from 7 countries in Latin America and conducted field research to Ecuador and Bolivia to explore the micro-foundations of the causal process. The central empirical claims of this dissertation depended on the court reform initiative data collected from countries across Latin America. Much of that data was collected from the internet, and funds from the dissertation improvement grant supported travel to Ecuador and Bolivia to gather pertinent legislative documents. Each trip lasted approximately 8 weeks, during which co-PI Driscoll traveled to National Congressional Library and Archive in the Plurinational Legislative Assembly in La Paz, Bolivia and the Archivo Biblioteca de la Función Legislativa in Quito, Ecuador. Moreover, Driscoll conducted elite interviews with legislators and their staff as well as former jurists regarding the establishment and maintenance of judicial independence in their respective countries. Describe the major findings resulting from these activities. Despite the importance of judicial independence for democratic entrenchment, macro-economic stability and the rule of law, systematic comparative evidence regarding its establishment and maintenance is relatively scarce. As such, though the literature converges in its explanations, lack of comparative data has left many claims untested. My dissertation offers a partial remedy to this deficit by providing a comparative measure of elite preferences regarding court independence based on legislative attempts at institutional reform. Courts vary substantially in the extent to which institutional rules guarantee their insulation from external political influence, otherwise known as their de jure independence. As legislators have the power to change these rules, they can shape the extent to which judges are incentivized to respond to the preferences of external political actors or agents. I theorize legislators’ interests in promoting or restricting judicial independence stem from proximate electoral considerations brought about by electoral institutions, the political climate, and public regard for high courts. To test this hypothesis, I establish a baseline measure of institutional insulation for the high courts of five Latin American countries over the past 15 years, scoring courts according to the institutional framework stipulated in the national constitution or judicial organic laws. I apply this same rubric to all legislative initiatives to reform national judicial institutions. Comparing reforms against the status quo score at the time of initiative introduction, I capture legislative attempts to further empower or dismantle formally independent judicial institutions. Consistent with the Insurance hypothesis of judicial independence, I find that government legislators sponsor independence-promoting reforms when faced with an imminent electoral defeat, though the effects of political fragmentation are more difficult to discern. Further, public esteem for the courts does appear to shield courts from inter-branch hostility. Qualitative accounts of recent judicial reform efforts in Bolivia and Ecuador explore two residual puzzles to complement the cross-national analysis. What research and teaching skills and experience has the project helped provide to those who worked on the project? This project has provided substantial research and instructional experience to co-PI Driscoll. Beyond the collection and organization of court-reform proposals from various countries in Latin America, her research design necessitated travel to Bolivia and Ecuador to retrieve legislative documents and secure elite interviews. The process of obtaining access to relevant archival materials and conducting elite interviews in La Paz and Quito is best described as 'on the job' research training. This yielded insights into both the practical challenges and fortuitous rewards that international field research inevitably entails. In addition, co-PI Driscoll has shared her experiences regarding the development and execution of her dissertation research in invited presentations at the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales in Quito, Ecuador and Washington University in St. Louis. The collection and processing of the wider corpus of bill initiation data will be the most comprehensive compilation of its kind, both in cross-sectional and cross-temporal scope. Co-PI Driscoll hopes this innovation will serve the needs of a wide variety of scholars interested in party and electoral systems, political representation and policy outcomes in comparative perspective.
