Brent Simpson University of South Carolina
At least since the 1960s social scientists have argued that large groups face greater problems than small groups in organizing successful collective actions. While many researchers have taken issue with this original reasoning and there is continuing debate about why group size impairs successful collective action, most collective action scholars agree that it does. Empirical studies in natural settings and carefully controlled laboratory experiments support the predicted negative relationship between group size and collective action. Importantly, systematic comparisons show that group size negatively affects cooperation even when the objective incentive to contribute to the group is held constant, and that people perceive large groups to be less efficacious than small groups, even under conditions in which large groups are objectively more efficacious. Of course, there are collective actions with large numbers of contributors in the real world. The question is thus how large groups overcome the problems associated with group size to realize their common interests. The answer proposed here is based on an emergent solution to the group size problem: Larger groups grow out of successful smaller collective actions. They so by capitalizing on the gains from starting small. That is, groups harness the higher contributions of initially small groups and continue those higher contributions as they grow larger.
The investigator will conduct three laboratory experiments designed to test key implications of the argument. The first experiment addresses the basic argument in the context of public goods provisions (where people must contribute private resources to produce a public good available to all). The second experiment extends the research in several directions. First, it will test the proposed solution to the group size problem in the context of common-pool resources (where people must refrain from overharvesting from publicly owned resources). In addition, the second experiment will address the role of a ?marketplace? of collective action groups, in which people make decisions about which group to join. The investigator hypothesizes that marketplaces help further catalyze the mechanisms through which successful small collective action groups grow into successful large collective actions. The third experiment tests the argument using larger groups.
Broader Impacts: In addition to the importance of gaining a theoretical understanding of the group size problem, and how large groups are able to realize their common interests, the research has a number of broader impacts. Many of the most important problems facing groups and societies, from the local to the global level, entail the production of public goods (e.g., maintenance of public media outlets, the creation and maintenance of blood and organ supplies) or the preservation of commons (healthy and productive forests and waterways). The collective action problems posed by public goods and common pool resources are exacerbated in larger groups. Thus, as societies continue to become interlinked, the collective action problems we face become increasingly global, making it even more important to understand the processes through which large groups can realize common interests (and the conditions under which they do not). In addition to these societal-level broader impacts, the research will provide education and training of graduate and undergraduate students.
Beneficial outcomes in life often require the coordinated efforts and inputs from many people working together to create more productive workplaces, safer communities, etc.. Similarly, avoiding detrimental outcomes, such as overfishing or overharvesting, often require the collective restrain of many people. But acting for the benefit of the greater good generally poses a "free rider" problem: While we would all be better off if we could act cooperatively, it is often in the interest of each individual to let others do the work, or shoulder the burden. Indeed, whether or not I contribute to a large scale collective effort may not even be perceptible in the larger scheme of things. Of course, if everyone acts according to his or her own self-interest, collective goals are not realized and, in some cases, collective disasters cannot be avoided. Existing research has taught us a lot about the conditions that promote or work to the detriment of collective success in such situations. That said, most prior work has focused on solutions to collective action in very small groups. The goal of this work was to develop solutions to collective action problems that might also apply to larger groups. To this end, we conducted a total of ten laboratory experiments that addressed various mechanisms for realizing cooperation and collective action in larger groups. Below is a brief recap of the studies. Three experiments are packaged together in a paper, currently under review (Simpson et al.) In this project, we investigate how competition between group members for new members can yield large, productive, collective actions. Results from the three laboratory experiments support our predictions about the conditions under which group members compete to attract new adherents by sacrificing more for group goals. Further, we find that prospective members join these more productive groups at much higher rates and then contribute to them at normative (high) levels, rather than free-riding. These processes give way to cumulative advantage, where initially productive groups are more successful at attracting new members, which spurs even more downstream membership gains to those initially productive groups. We thus show that competition for group members can yield large inequalities in the size and success of collective action groups. Two other experiments deal with how interpersonal moral judgments that group members routinely make about one another can facilitate collective action without the costs and drawbacks of monetary sanctioning (the standard solution in the collective action literature). This project thus brings a classic sociological insight to bear on an important, interdisciplinary problem. I (along with collaborators Willer and PhD student Harrell) will submit the paper that reports these experiments within the next few months. Two experiments address leadership in collective action. Among other things the model of leadership we develop and tests shows how leadership can overcome the problems with the standard solution to collective action (peer to peer monetary sanctioning). Among other things, as has often been noted, peer to peer sanctioning breaks down in large groups. These experiments form the basis of Harrell's PhD dissertation. Additionally, one paper (with Harrell) is currently under review and data from the second experiment are now being analyzed. The results will be written up for a paper with Harrell in the coming months. Two other experiments investigate how processes of generalized and indirect reciprocity can jointly facilitate cooperation in larger networks of actors. These results are very promising and several graduate students and I will begin writing up these results in the coming months. A final experiment addressed the role of norms in dynamic collective action groups. Part of these data formed the basis of two MA theses. I plan to begin analyzing these data this summer and will write them up shortly thereafter. As described above, this research directly resulted in several papers currently under review, as well as several additional papers that are in varying stages of development. Finally, the grant activity has facilitated a number of already-published (or accepted for publication) papers, including: Brent Simpson and Robb Willer. 2015 "Beyond Altruism: Sociological Foundations of Cooperation and Prosocial Behavior." Annual Review of Sociology. Brent Simpson, Matthew Brashears, Eric Gladstone and Ashley Harrell. 2014 "Birds of Different Feathers Cooperate Together: No Evidence for Altruism Homophily in Networks." Sociological Science Kyle Irwin, Laetitia Mulder, and Brent Simpson. 2014. "The Detrimental Effects of Rewards and Punishments on Intra-Group Trust." Social Psychology Quarterly Brent Simpson, Ashley Harrell, and Robb Willer. 2013. "Hidden Paths from Morality to Social Order: Moral Judgments Promote Prosocial Behavior."Social Forces Beyond these outcomes, the project directly supported a Phd Student,several MA students and projects and four undergraduate students. In addition to these students, the project introduced dozens of additional students to the process of conducting social science research. Several went on to pursue graduate degrees as a consequence of their involvement in this research.
