Although some would argue that American's support for the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars has been based on increased needs for security in a post-9/11 world, there is also evidence that public support for these wars has been more deeply rooted in needs for retribution and vengeance. Which explanation accounts for support for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq has important theoretical and practical implications. This research empirically tests competing hypotheses about what Osama bin Laden's (OBL's) death means to U.S. citizens, with a particular focus on the implications of his death for people's policy preferences with respect to continued American military involvement in the Middle East. OBL's death is a watershed moment and opportunity to study (a) how people cope with terrorist attacks, (b) the role that needs for and achieving vengeance play in Americans' public policy preferences, and (c) how important vengeful motives are relative to other concerns such as security, incapacitation, and deterrence.
The participants for this study are a subsample of approximately 7,000 individuals who completed surveys in either 2001 or 2003 that included measures of desires for revenge/vengeance for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Although a great deal of time has passed since the initial surveys, the advantages of returning to these participants are numerous, including not having to rely on retrospective accounts of how vengeful people felt in the more immediate aftermath of 9/11, and the ability to more firmly establish that proposed causes (e.g., post-9/11 needs for vengeance and support for an expanded war against terrorism) preceded the proposed effects (e.g., a sense of "mission accomplished" at the death of OBL).
This study adds to the still limited knowledge of how Americans respond to terrorist threats, and the full post-attack consequences of terrorist attacks for public opinion and policy preferences. This RAPID proposal fulfills the NSF RAPID funding criterion of the need for urgent support as well as the other funding criteria of intellectual merit and broader impacts. NSF reviewed this proposal internally.
This study investigated the degree to which the assassination of the terrorist mastermind, Osama bin Laden (OBL), appeased versus fed American?s desire for vengeance for the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and whether feelings that vengeance had been achieved would affect Americans' post-assassination levels of support for a continued war on terror. To test these questions, we re-contacted people who participated in a nationally representative survey that measured desires for vengeance for 9/11 in early 2003, to complete another survey shortly after the U.S. military assassinated Osama bin Laden in May of 2011. Desires for vengeance for 9/11 measured in 2003 predicted stronger beliefs that assassinating OBL avenged 9/11. That said, the direct effect of 2003 needs for vengeance for 9/11?as well as the indirect effects of 2003 needs for vengeance mediated through the beliefs that assassinating OBL avenged 9/11?were most strongly associated with diminished, rather than increased closure about 9/11 in 2011. In addition, these needs for vengeance were also strongly associated with increased desire to continue to seek 9/11 vengeance and support for continued continued U.S. militsary engagement in the Middle East. The high level of support for continued military engagement in the middle east emerged regardless of whether the targets of military involvement were seen as responsible for the 9/11 attacks. In short, achieving vengeance is very satisfying, but nonetheless breeds continuing needs for vengeance and bellicosity, rather than a psychological sense of closure.
