This dissertation project aims to understand how different regulatory institutions interact. It will examine the following research question: "Why has the European Union (EU) responded to existing private environmental regulation in different issue areas in diverse regulatory ways?" Private environmental regulation in this project refers to voluntary certification and eco-labeling programs developed by non-state actors (industry organizations; firms; non-governmental organizations) to induce corporate environmentally friendly behavior. By examining EU responses to private regulation in four issue areas (organic agriculture, biofuels, fisheries, and fair trade) this research will explain why in some cases the EU has responded strongly by developing its own public certification program, while in other cases it has decided not to intervene at all, or only in a very limited way.
By examining the historical co-evolution of public policy and private regulation in these issue areas, and by analyzing the decision-making processes of the EU's regulatory responses, this study will identify the causal mechanisms and processes that can explain the observed variation. Through in-depth, semi-structured interviews I will gather original data from EU officials and decision-makers, EU-level and national interest and advocacy groups, representatives from private environmental regulatory programs, issue experts and academics. These data will be complemented with data on the decision-making processes, which will be gathered during desk research and from notes and documents obtained from interviewees.
This dissertation's main intellectual contribution is its focus on an unexplored dependent variable, namely the regulatory responses of public authorities to private environmental regulation. This study will contribute to the nascent research on the interaction between public and private regulation and on the role of non-state actors in politics more broadly. Even though this dissertation will be limited to environmental issue areas, it is expected that the conclusions are generalizable to other issue areas as well. It is not expected, in other words, that the particular characteristics of the environmental issues determine public responses to private regulation, but rather that more general factors, such as the specific features of private regulatory programs and corporate involvement in these programs, explain public authorities' responses.
Private actors are currently using certification and labeling programs to address environmental and social problems in an increasingly diverse range of issue areas. This research will contribute to generating policy relevant knowledge on how public authorities can attain a better integration of public and private policy instruments. Furthermore, understanding the way public policy interacts with private regulatory programs will generate useful information for initiators of such programs regarding their design and functioning.
The research project focused on a heretofore underexplored dependent variable, namely the regulatory responses of public authorities to private environmental and social regulation. Private regulation in this project refers to voluntary corporate social responsibility programs (such as certification and eco?labeling programs) developed by non?state actors (industry organizations; firms; non?governmental organizations) to induce corporate environmentally friendly behavior. The project has provided original data on eight different policy making processes in the European Union (EU) from the late 1980s up until today. The issue areas include organic agriculture, fair trade, biofuels and fisheries. Interviews were conducted with policy makers, business and non-governmental interest organizations, experts and academics. The aim of the interviews was twofold: 1. to gain deeper insights into the historical co-evolution of public and private regulation in the chosen issue areas; 2. to identify the causal factors that can explain the variation in the EU’s regulatory responses to private regulatory programs. The interviews provided support for the main working hypothesis that the structure of the existing "market" for private regulation and the demands for public intervention that this generates can to a significant degree explain public authorities’ regulatory responses. The proliferation of private regulatory programs and their competitive character create large incentives for public regulatory interventions in order to structure the market for private regulation. The mechanisms at work are twofold. First, a proliferation of private regulatory programs and claims can lead to consumer confusion and lack of confidence in the veracity of the claims made. To overcome this information asymmetry between the public and the private standard setters, a public authority can provide a minimum baseline standard and/or a visible label to indicate compliance with the standard. Second, a lack of private harmonization across national borders can create internal EU market barriers to trade, which creates incentives for harmonization at a higher political level. Furthermore, a new insight that emerged from the interviews was that a convergence of interests between public and private standard-setters regarding the goal of public regulatory interventions also has a direct influence on a public authority’s regulatory intervention, irrespective of the underlying structure of the market for private regulation. Finally, and paradoxically, the research finds that a stronger regulatory intervention by a public authority does not necessarily undermine private authority. We find that the impact of public regulatory interventions on the functioning and authority of private regulatory initiatives differs dependent on the concrete modalities of the regulatory intervention – in terms of public interventions in standard setting (minimum baseline or strict standard), the delegation of verification functions to private programs (and especially the extent to which private standard setters are incentivized to set their own, stricter standard), or the requirements regarding the organizational features of private programs (in terms of requirements for third party auditing and accreditation of auditors). The research project also provides policy advice to policy makers and suggestions to private standard setting organizations regarding the impacts of public regulation on the functioning of private standard setting organizations, and regarding ways to improve public and private regulations’ co-existence. In particular, the research finds that harmonization among and/or mutual recognition of private regulatory programs could prevent public regulation from being established and thus provide larger freedom to private standard setters in the long term. At the same time, once public regulation has been established in the form of a substantive public standard and verification of this standard is delegated to private actors, it is recommended – in particular in federal or federal-like system like the EU’s - that the public authority requires mutual recognition among private programs so as to prevent barriers to trade. Furthermore, to the extent that the public standard equally applies to domestic and imported products, there is a possibility of a ratcheting up of both public and private standards, which is not only related to the size and importance of the EU market for non-EU producers, but also to the concrete modalities of the regulatory intervention, as described above. Finally, as mentioned, the research finds that a strong public regulatory intervention does not necessarily result in private authority being undermined. This implies that public regulation can be beneficial for private standard setters (especially in terms of weeding out false claims in the market, or providing financial resources to producers and programs) and should not immediately be seen as a threat to the existence or functioning of private regulatory institutions.
