Can development programs and reforms reduce violence and decrease support for armed groups? This research will analyze the impact of three different interventions on violence: land reforms that bolster the rights and land holdings of low-income sharecroppers, a group associated with insurrection; guarantees up to 100 days of individual wage labor for each rural household; and mandated political representation for disadvantaged minorities in village councils. Research will utilize archival and survey-based data -- varying over space and time to measure the effect these programs have on violence and civilian support for governments. The researchers have collected micro-level data both online and in government offices. This project will fund the completion of a stratified random sample survey of approximately 1,500 households across 150 village clusters. By combining measurements of armed group behavior as reported in newspapers with other data collected, this research will determine whether development initiatives affect conflict outcomes.
This project will test theories related to how short-term economic incentives affect violent conflict, how long-term economic inequality shapes violence, and how political discrimination impacts the dynamics of civil war. Studying the impact of these large development programs is crucial to improving the livelihoods of the most vulnerable populations, and potentially, finding non-military strategies to ameliorating civil war.
Under what conditions does guaranteeing minority political representation reduce violence? In this project I assessed how systematic political incorporation of individuals from India’s Scheduled Tribes into the village political system in Jharkhand, India affected patterns of political violence. Scheduled Tribes are individuals with the lowest economic security and least political inclusion in the country. To address this question I conducted an original household survey in Jharkhand, India with more than 1,600 individuals. To measure the impact of electoral quotas for local government chair-positions for individuals from ST communities I compared local government councils where leadership positions were reserved for STs with those councils that were not. I find that reserving local councils for ST leaders reduces political violence in the two-year period after village elections were held (2011-2012). Specifically, individuals living in reserved regions of Northern Jharkhand are 39-44% less likely to report Maoist-related violence than those in unreserved areas. This differential reduction in violence is driven by a change in the behavior of Maoist armed groups who seek to gain the support and resources of the newly elected ST leaders. These results are some of the first to measure the effects and pathways by which minority representation may reduce political violence. These findings provide several implications for existing literature on ethnic inclusion and literature on development and institution-building policies in conflict zones. These results suggest that scholars and policymakers should carefully consider incentives of armed groups when studying or extending institutions and other large-scale development works to conflict areas. Recent research on development and institution building in conflict areas argues that successful state implementation of local electoral institutions or community driven development will ‘win the hearts and minds’ and thereby wean civilians from reliance on or support towards armed groups. By contrast I find in Jharkhand that short-term changes in political conflict not driven by changes in the attitudes or behavior of civilians by way of government policies but rather change in the behavior armed groups themselves.
