Electoral accountability and judicial institutions are two important means of changing existing corruption dynamics in government. Yet in a number of countries, corrupt politicians frequently get reelected, reinforcing the persistence of corruption. This project seeks to understand when and why voters punish corrupt politicians. The work focuses on the effect of (1) types of candidate corruption, (2) court rulings, (3) a candidate's political party, and (4) a voter's level of partisanship on the voter's decision to vote against a corrupt politician. The project will develop a survey with an embedded experiment that will shed light on the mechanisms that lead voters to punish corrupt politicians in Brazil, a country where 168 national legislators face criminal charges or are under investigation. The survey of 2,000 voters will expose respondents to candidate choices with varying corruption types, political parties, and court rulings on candidate corruption. This research fills a void in the literature on corruption, and offers a perspective on how political determinants, such as the party system and partisan attachments, mediate corruption perceptions.
The project deepens our understanding of two important means of changing corruption dynamics in government: electoral accountability and judicial institutions. The research also enables government agencies and civil society organizations to craft strategies for information campaigns designed to inform citizens of candidate corruption. Finally, the work engages the political science and legal community in Brazil, facilitating cross-border scholarly exchange.
