This study aims to determine whether the efficiency of inspections can be improved by changing the number of inspectors sent to conduct an inspection. Individuals behave differently in group settings and therefore inspections conducted by a group, as opposed to a sole-inspector, may result in different outcomes (such as in the severity of sanctions or the ability to deter future violations). This study will also investigate several explanations for why an additional inspector might matter, including collusion, social pressure or the ability to share work. Concern has been expressed that inspectors might become 'captured' by the regulated party or that social pressure might dissuade inspectors from issuing citations for violations. This project will add to the small but growing literature on the behavior of enforcement agents as well as identify the role of group effects in the inspector-inspected relationship as an important area of scientific inquiry.
This study will examine data from government inspections of offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico to determine whether increasing the number of inspectors sent to a platform influences the severity of penalties issued as well as the deterrence of future oil spills, injuries, and fatalities. Two natural experiments (specifically, daily variation in helicopter flying conditions and a permanent closure of an inspections office) will be used to estimate the effect of inspection group size and the number of prior visits of the same platform by the same inspector.
This project also has substantial broader impacts. Current budgetary pressures on regulatory agencies underscore the importance of designing optimal inspections. This project will provide new insights to regulators on the effectiveness of increasing enforcement as well as how to properly deploy scarce inspector resources. Concerns about inspection in the nuclear, coal mining, and oil industries highlights the importance of understanding the role that inspector intensity plays in ensuring compliance.
