Following a negotiated settlement to a civil war, what causes warring parties to fulfill their promises of implementing reforms in different issue areas such as elections, economic redistribution, or integration of former combatants? In other words, why are some peace agreements fully implemented while others are only partially or never implemented? When and why do parties to an agreement decide to resume fighting instead of abiding by the terms of a settlement? This project addresses these questions by explaining variation in the degree of agreement implementation and consequently the likelihood that conflict will recur. The main argument advanced is that dynamics at both the negotiations and implementation stage - such as third party involvement and pressure or change in the amount of support given to warring parties - should be taken into account in order to fully understand successful transitions to peace. To do this the project theorizes about a range of factors that alter warring parties' incentives to continue implementation. Propositions are tested using statistical analysis of disaggregated data on post-conflict years following 83 agreements signed between 1975 and 2012 as well as in-depth case studies.
The project's intellectual merits are associated with advances in theorizing and analysis of conflict resolution. The successful implementation of peace agreements is crucial for a durable peace. Previous studies show that conflict among the same groups is less likely to recur if implementation of an agreement is successful. What is missing in most of these studies is careful theorizing and empirical testing of the factors that lead to successful implementation. Although existing case studies look at the implementation processes of select civil wars or that focus on individual aspects of transitions such as post-conflict elections, there is no comprehensive theory and empirical analysis of post-conflict years and the implementation process. This project fills this significant gap by providing a general theory of the implementation process and tests hypotheses with new data on post-conflict years. Additionally, given the relationship found between successful implementation and the duration of peace in various studies, explaining what leads to successful implementation has significant implications for conflict recurrence. The second part of the project thus seeks to identify the conditions under which parties overcome problems in the implementation process and are able to successfully renegotiate an agreement without resort to violence and when implementation fails and large-scale violence resumes. In addition to theoretical and empirical contributions, the data collected for this project on post-conflict years will likely create opportunities to answer other interesting questions about the post-conflict processes. The final data generated will be compatible with other major datasets in the field so that future scholars will be able to easily use and extend the data for relevant research projects.
This project not only aims to fill a gap in the theoretical and empirical literature in conflict resolution but also seeks to offer policy implications on how to increase the likelihood of achieving stable peace. Fostering security and reconstruction in post-conflict environments in fragile countries (e.g., Iraq or Afghanistan) helps to prevent greater instability, radicalization and terrorism that would emerge in the absence of well-established governance, which is one of the main national security strategies of the United States. As various studies point out, recurring conflicts have outnumbered new conflicts every year since the mid-1990s and almost half of internal armed conflicts have recurred following a negotiated settlement. This suggests that devoting resources to achieving post-conflict stability and successful transition in fragile countries is an important yet difficult task that warrants significant further research. By identifying the factors that incentivize warring parties to keep the peace and continue implementation of a settlement, this project will help third parties and the international community to employ more effective post-conflict management and monitoring strategies. Similarly, shedding light on the effects of third party involvement in conflict areas at different stages of conflict (negotiations and implementation) will also have direct policy implications for the timing and effectiveness of US as well as other international actor and donor involvement in conflict prone states.
