A state tacitly bargains with another state when it attempts to manipulate the latter's policy choices through its behavior rather than by relying on formal or informal diplomatic exchanges. The process is tacit because actions rather than rhetoric constitute the critical medium of communication; it is bargaining and not coercion because the actions are aimed at influencing an outcome that can only be achieved through some measure of joint voluntary behavior. In the past few years, the slow progress and modest achievements of formal negotiations have prompted speculation about the potential of tacit bargaining as an alternative mechanism for promoting arms control. It has been argued, for example, that the reduction of nuclear weapons can be most effectively pursued by way of unilateral or reciprocal restraint (e.g., slowing the deployment of new weapons) outside the context of negotiations. This project evaluates the capacity of specific tacit bargaining strategies to stabilize or reduce arms races. Formal analysis and simulation are used to explore the ability of these strategies to cope with uncertainty about the motives of the rival state, bluffing, misinterpretation, the time-preference of decision makers, and a multiplicity of response options. Despite the complexity created by the simultaneous operation of these factors, recent work in this area suggests that certain generalizations will emerge that can aid a nation in deciding how to conduct tacit bargaining as well as to help social scientists understand tacit bargaining as an alternative mechanism for promoting arms control.
