This project investigates the way that costs to decision making affect political choices. In all political settings there are costs to making a decision. For example, in a legislative setting, such as Congress, members do not settle on policies in the absence of costs. Proposed policies require committee consideration, which in turn use committee staff resources and committee members' time. Policies coming to the floor require debate, which in turn takes up time from considering other proposals. Reconciling legislation between the two Chambers also consumes staff resources and conference committee members' time. In short, all legislation passing through Congress carries with it a variety of costs to decision making. In this investigation the researchers employ formal analytical models in order to investigate the effect of decision costs on political decision making. They build on an important literature in political science and economics that is concerned with understanding political choices. The investigators regard costs to decision making as an important (and ignored) piece of the puzzle for understanding political choices. The focus is on three general types of costs: agenda access costs .. costs associated with proposing, amending or voting on an agenda; information costs .. costs associated with gathering or generating information about alternatives in the choice process; and time costs .. costs associated with the amount of time given over to making political choices. Half of this project is devoted to developing theoretical hypotheses which can then be tested in an empirical context. The second half of this research is focused on empirical research. In order to systematically test the theoretical hypotheses, the investigators utilize laboratory experimental methods. These experiments involve small groups of individuals making choices in a committee.like setting. Participants in these experiments are seated at microcomputer terminals which are linked together in a Local Area Network. All interaction between participants takes place over the computer terminals, thus providing strong controls on participant behavior. Participants are allowed to build an agenda across these proposals. Motivation in the experiment is provided by paying individuals in cash for their choice. The experiments are designed to test various attributes of decision costs that are generated from the theoretical models. These models in turn provide strong predictions for the experimental results. This research provides important insights into a neglected area of political decision making. Rather than relying simply on theoretical models of behavior in a political context, this research also provides empirical test of the models. At the completion of this research we can expect rich theoretical models which have been verified in an experimental setting.
