Since the 1940s, there has been considerable scholarly interest and research on the behavior and decisionmaking processes of the Supreme Court. Although scholars disagree on numerous aspects of Court decisionmaking, almost all operate under some basic assumptions about the very nature of the judicial process. One of these involves Court behavior in times of external crisis, periods during which the United States or its nationals are threatened by the military forces of another state such as wars or other foreign confrontations and disputes. The view of most Court scholars is that the Court is less tolerant of rights and liberties during periods of turmoil. This view has become entrenched in the scholarly literature so as to make it part of the "conventional wisdom." Yet, there has been no systematic research to determine whether the hypothesized impact of crises is a valid portrayal. This study will test the "crisis" thesis which asserts that the Court is more intolerant toward issues of individual rights and liberties during times of external security crises. Using a data base consisting of all cases involving individual rights and liberties resolved by the Court since the early 1800s, a number of known predictors of macro-level behavior will be explored to assess the relative effect of international crises on decisionmaking. Independent variables include measures of current partisan control of the Court, the presidency, and the Congress; characteristics of the litigants; and characteristics of the external security crises. This project not only will determine the validity of the crisis thesis, but also it will map the contours of this phenomenon and develop the theoretical propositions upon which it rests. The research imbeds the Supreme Court in a general theory of conflict and the state and in doing so blends theoretical and methodological insights about how the state responds internally to conditions of actual or threatened conflict imposed from beyond its borders. Relatedly, the creation of a longitudinal database on the Supreme Court over approximately seventy-five years will provide the opportunity for other scholars to make inroads into understanding the Court's institutional role and its place within the political regime as it has evolved and developed over time. Finally, viewing governmental processes and behavior through this macro-level approach will provide valuable insights into the development of legal and political institutions and, in particular, the influence of transnational conditions.
