Although faced with massive job losses in recent years, labor unions in advanced industrial countries only occasionally have responded with strikes or other industrial actions. Previous research in Political Science suggests that variations in the responses of organized labor to threats of work force reduction are linked to the institutional context of labor-management relations. Specifically, where seniority protects union leaders from layoffs industrial actions are less common. Research in economics suggests in contrast that unions are indifferent to layoffs when the average member is protected. This research attempts to reconcile these disparate perspectives and to develop a comprehensive and unified political economic theory of industrial action. Specifically, this award is intended to prepare this talented young investigator to conduct the innovative research she proposes. Specifically, the award will be used to allow the investigator to supplement her training in Political Science with additional training in Economics and econometrics. This additional training will enable the investigator to further pursue the productive line of research already begun. When completed this research should increase our understanding of labor-management relations and provide insights into the causes of strikes and other industrial actions.
