The purpose of this project is to analyze the strategic aspects of international agreement on the abatement of emissions that cause transboundary pollution. Some researchers have suggested that the problem of obtaining international cooperation has the structure of a prisoners' dilemma game in that all parties would be better off if they cooperated, but any one of them has an incentive to cheat or break the rules. Two important questions are raised about the appropriateness of using the this framework for analyzing international agreements related to pollution problems. One is whether the prisoners' dilemma construct is appropriate in this context. And the second is whether, even if it is, a cooperative solution will not be forthcoming. Cooperation is more likely to occur in a repeated game situations, where the same parties face each other time after time as is often the case with international relations. This research will develop a theoretical framework for analyzing the evolution of cooperation between countries in the area of international abatement control. Such cooperation can emerge via coalitions in a cooperative framework, or by tacit agreements that emerge via trigger strategies in repeated games. Both approaches will be pursued in this project. The notion of a critical coalition is introduced into the theoretical framework which is a coalition of countries agreeing to implement an abatement agreement that has certain stability properties. This project is important because it will produce useful insights into the process of international negotiation on global change, and provide a basis for choosing negotiating frameworks and strategies that will lead to stable and positive outcomes.
