This is an accomplishment based renewal project for the principal investigator to continue his research on various topics in dynamic games and implementation theory. It includes the following topics. (1) The study extends previous research on evolutionary games to allow discounting and non-infinitesimal probabilities of mistakes. (2) The project characterizes equilibria in repeated games with unobservable actions and no publicly observable outcomes. (3) The analysis continues to investigate models of credit markets, contract renegotiation in multi-period models, and the implementation problem in cases of renegotiation with incomplete information. (4) The undertaking extends the Markov perfect equilibrium - an equilibrium in which strategies depend only on those past variables that are payoff-relevant - to the cases of incomplete information or imperfect information. These studies all deal with important topics in dynamic game theory which promise to continue to help generate progress in different areas in economics as well as in other social sciences.
