The right of appeal is a critical factor in the American judicial system not only because of its implications for the status of the individual in the political system but also because its use defines the real scope of the judiciary. Therefore, the decision by a losing litigant to appeal, or not to appeal, carries great import for the functioning and legitimacy of the political system. This issue has been addressed at the theoretical level, producing a range of models purporting to account for the decision to appeal: a systemic model, that locates the explanation of a decision to appeal in the structure and process of the judicial system itself; an individual resources model, that imputes the decision to the litigant's access to resources; an economic model suggesting that a calculus of costs and benefits determines the decision; and a psychological model that posits three motivational processes of naming, blaming and claiming. These models all assume that the decision to litigate is determined by some kind of response to the outcome of the case at trial, but no empirical work has yet been done to test the validity of these models. Another theory of litigant decision-making focuses not only on the outcome of any case but also on how the procedure to reach that outcome affects the litigant. Empirical studies of this "procedural justice factor" at the trial level suggest that it could be applicable to the decision to appeal. This doctoral dissertation proposes to test hypotheses drawn from these various theories. Data will be collected from several sources. First, the investigator will analyze interview data from the RAND/ICJ study. Second, 60 open-ended interviews will be conducted with losing litigants in tort and contract cases who filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals of Cook County in Chicago. For purposes of testing external validity, a comparable group will be interviewed in Ramsey County in Minnesota. A control group of losing litigants who chose not to appeal will also be interviewed in each jurisdiction. Third, an extensive questionnaire will be administered to 100 appellants and 100 non- appellants in tort and contract actions, including both plaintiff and defendant appellants. Various quantitative and qualitative analyses will be employed to test the validity of the various explanatory models discussed above. The research will make an important theoretical contribution to our understanding of individual dynamics within the judicial system. The findings will clarify a continuing debate over the character of litigant motivations, and provide an empirical basis for interpreting how these motivations affect the appellate process.
