9409153 Austen-Smith This research is to continue the investigation on the informational role of interest groups and its connection to the giving of campaign contributions on the policy process. During the initial stages of the research, the investigator developed a framework that explicitly integrates both campaign contributions and lobbying, considered in informational terms. The key idea is that lobbying is predominantly an informational activity. Legislators have to make decisions (set agendas, vote, and so forth) on issues about which they often know relatively little. Interest groups, however, are frequently well-informed about the consequences of particular legislation for their particular interests; consequently, legislators would like to become informed by listening to lobbyists. A principal implication of the framework was that campaign contributions per se do not constitute sufficient incentives for a legislator to grant access to a group that wishes to influence the legislator's decision by providing salient information. The reason is that the legislator has an incentive to listen to those groups who share his or her policy preferences, irrespective of any monies they may have given. This finding suggests the correlation between money and access is indirect. Rather than "buy" access, groups give money to candidates whose policy preferences reflect their own so that the resulting legislature will consist of legislators who will seek them out on informational grounds, irrespective of any campaign contributions. From this perspective, the issues then concern how groups decide to whom to contribute and how campaign expenditures influence voting behavior within the electorate. The research to be undertaken addresses both of these concerns, focusing on the (indirect) access motivation for contributing and on the advertising role of campaign expenditures.
