This research consists of three separate parts. The first involves the analysis of product design innovation and fashion cycles using dynamic game theory. A model of the fashion cycle will be developed in which fashion is used as a signaling device in a mating game. Designers can create durable design commodities which are used by consumers to signal and to screen prospective partners. In this context price and innovation, diffusion of fashion, and conspicuous consumption behavior will be examined. The second part of the project focuses on the comparison of equilibrium outcomes in dynamic games when there are a large finite number of players and when there are a continuum of players. The third part involves analyzing the participation and voting behavior in two candidate elections when voters do not have the same information. The conditions under which voters will abstain form voting will be examined. In addition, the efficiency of elections as a mechanism to aggregate information will be analyzed, as well as conditions under which election outcomes are biased in favor of a minority.
