Austin-Smith SBR 9510877 Despite extensive research devoted to the study of collective decision making, relatively little is known about the decision making under conditions of uncertainty. In a world in which decision makers have the same fundamental preferences but operate in a situation where information is scarce and unequally shared, group members may disagree with respect to the available alternatives as a result of informational asymetries. Under such conditions, the Condorcet Jury Theorem concludes: majorities are more likely to select the "correct" alternative than any single individual when there is uncertainty about which alternative is in fact the best. This proposal seeks funding to investigate the properties of the Condorcet Jury Theorem. It will develop a theory of collective decision making under a judgment-based model of democracy. Game theoretic analyses will help inform the strategic considerations under which the impact of the jury theorem can be assessed. The crucial role played by information aggregation in conditions of uncertainty will be highlighted.
