This is an experimental study of power in negotiated and non-negotiated exchange. It develops and tests a theory of how the form of social exchange affects the distribution of power in exchange networks. These two forms of exchange create different relations between actors' behaviors and their outcomes, and they provide actors with different amounts of information about their potential outcomes from exchange. In the absence of negotiation, exchange partners perform individual acts that provide benefits for one another, without knowing what, if anything, they will receive in return. But when exchanges are negotiated, actors engage in joint action (negotiating the terms of an agreement) that provides benefits for both. Whether equal or unequal, these benefits are known and agreed upon in advance. The theory argues that these differences affect the mechanisms that underlie the use of power and the development of inequality in exchange networks. Consequently, structural variations in the availability and number of alternatives will have very different effects on power use in negotiated and reciprocal exchange, and information that reduces uncertainty about outcomes will have stronger effects on power use in reciprocal than negotiated exchange. Three laboratory experiments will be carried out to test the predicted effects of network structure and information on power use for the two forms of exchange. %%% This project is the first systematic comparison of these basic forms of direct exchange. While the classical exchange theories (e.g. Peter Blau and George Homans) excluded bargaining and negotiated exchange from the scope of their theories, most contemporary theorists have done the opposite, concentrating exclusively on negotiated exchanges with strictly binding agreements. The prevalence of both forms of exchange in social life requires research of this kind to compare them.
