SBR - 9515075 Box-Steffensmeier This project investigates strategic position taking in legislative assemblies by studying the timing of choices that representatives make in the U.S. Senate and House. This study is important for three reasons: it adds information on the context and sequence of decision making; it more closely approximates members' strategic considerations; and the process becomes the focus of analysis rather than the final result. Research into the timing of legislator vote choices should provide insight into theoretical questions on the strategic behavior of legislators, institutional constraints on members, and strategies of interest group influence. The project examines five case studies including the congressional vote on NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement called "the most important vote on Capitol Hill since the Berlin Wall came down". The project also has an important methodological component. It will develop and apply a split population hazards model. This model will allow researchers to estimate separately the effects of the determinants of vote choice from the determinants of the timing of vote choice. * * *
