9515149 Gilligan The dominant theory used to explain international relations (neo-realism) finds the primary source of national security decisions in the dog-eat-dog world of the international system. At the core of this theory is the belief that the international behavior of states is driven by the dictates of national self-preservation within an anarchic system. In studies of domestic politics, however, the dominant approach is to think of political decisions as driven by politicians' desire to stay in power. This investigation combines these insights by modeling the international behavior of the state in terms of the political survival of the politicians who make national policy. This model incorporates both realist and domestic concerns, as politicians must worry about foreign military threats to their regime's survival as well as internal threats from domestic rivals for power. The researchers argue that the constraints of regime preservation are much more binding than the constraints of international anarchy alone, and that such a combined perspective explains the behaviors accounted for by a systemic approach as well as those cases neo-realism can not explain. The formal model generates specific and falsifiable claims regarding many aspects of international behavior, but the investigators intend to focus on a central behavior for most neo-realist models - - security alliance formation. By compiling existing data on the economic, military, and political characteristics of nations considering joining an alliance, as well as gathering new information on parameters such as perceived domestic and international threat, the investigators evaluate the strength of a model of regime preservation in explaining patterns of alliance formation. ***

Agency
National Science Foundation (NSF)
Institute
Division of Social and Economic Sciences (SES)
Type
Standard Grant (Standard)
Application #
9515149
Program Officer
Frank P. Scioli Jr.
Project Start
Project End
Budget Start
1996-03-01
Budget End
1998-08-31
Support Year
Fiscal Year
1995
Total Cost
$70,000
Indirect Cost
Name
New York University
Department
Type
DUNS #
City
New York
State
NY
Country
United States
Zip Code
10012