Traditional formal theoretical analyses of spatial voting applied to large elections have focused almost exclusively on elections in which voters make their choices simultaneously. In many cases this is an accurate portrayal and although voting may take place sequentially over a period of time, voters typically make their choices without the knowledge of the choices made by those who have voted earlier. However, there are other notable large elections in which groups of voters make choices with knowledge of the choices made by earlier voters in the same election. In this investigation, the researchers focus on a particularly interesting case of sequential voting: presidential primaries in the United States. In the presidential primary system voters in states that have later primaries know the outcomes of the primaries in earlier states when they make their choices. However, the nomination of the party is a function of the votes in both early and later states. Thus, voting that determines the nomination, because of the primary system, occurs sequentially. In this research the investigators focus on two ways in which sequential voting is different from simultaneous voting and the possibility that the voting process leads to different outcomes as a consequence. First, there is the possibility for information aggregation during the sequential voting process that is not possible under simultaneous voting. Second, when voting is sequential there is the unique possibility for candidates to withdraw from the election during the voting process. The current research extends an earlier investigation of information aggregation by examining the role of differences in risk preferences on the voting behavior and candidate selected. The research is then extends the theoretical model to consider the effects of candidate exit on these factors. The research consists of experimental tests of the theoretical predictions.
