This research is concerned with understanding the impact of redistricting on legislative elections. The standard wisdom holds that redistricting has only a minimal effect on elections; producing tiny changes in partisan gain or doing little to protect incumbents. While a great deal of research has been undertaken on this problem, the researchers argue that previous work has improperly modeled the effects. Using a formal model of strategic redistricting, the PIs show that a variety of actors, ranging from state legislators to state judges have important effects on how redistricting lines are drawn. While this is well known, they also show the conditions under when their strategic behavior will have an impact on partisan gains and incumbent advantage. The researchers test crucial features of their model by examining the array of redistricting changes that occurred in the 1960's. This was a key period in American politics and has often been associated with the rise of an incumbency advantage. The researchers find that redistricting is an important strategic tool to change partisan advantage and to protect incumbents.
