It has become commonplace to read claims that one should not take the best available scientific theories as giving literal accounts of the world. Many such arguments rest upon various sorts of perspectivalism that deny unique epistemic warrant to the theoretical conclusions of science. But when it comes to foundational theories of physics, there are a number of grounds for skepticism that are more pertinent than those arising from the various methodological relativisms currently in fashion. For example, physical theories often posit rich relationships among unobservable entities and properties. Further, such theories also generally apply only to idealized systems, which are never encountered in the world. Finally, it is often claimed that such theories are in flux, subject to correction, or soon to be replaced by even better theories. This project addresses such fundamental philosophical questions about the status of physical theories, replacing general comments about the unreal abstractness and temporary character of such theories with a far more substantial analysis that is embedded within the context of particular theories. This move makes the argument far more concrete, convincing and useful than the looser generalities.
