This award supports preliminary research for a project that attempts to provide theoretical foundations for traditional game theoretic solution concepts, built on the possibility that players' payoffs may be different than the modeler has initially supposed. The model is evolutionary, but deviates from the traditional approach in this field. The traditional approach to evolution assumes that individuals are committed to play particular strategies. Evolution selects against unsuccessful strategies in favor of successful ones. In this model individuals are assumed to have preferences over game outcomes and make strategic choices on the basis of these preferences. Evolution selects those preferences that yield successful strategy choices. For economic applications, this is a more appealing approach to modeling individual behavior, and this proposal describes how the approach surmounts many of the theoretical drawbacks of traditional models. ? _/?,ÃÂ¥ ?/> ©?À©%?À©¥ ??ÂÂÃ?Ã>?â ?ÃÂ¥?ÃÃ> ¥©Ã¢à _/??? ¥©Ã???â ?©??© ?/> ¥©Ã> ?à ¥Ã¢¥Ã? /À/?>¢¥ _???? %Ã?Ã% ?/Â¥/ ?> ???,Ã?¢ />? Â??_¢ ?> ???Ã? Â¥? ?>?Ã?¢¥/>? ¥©à ?/?¢Ã¢ ? /ÀÀ?ÃÀ/¥à Â%??Â¥?/Â¥??>¢ ¼? ¢¥??` ¥©Ã¢à ?¢¢?â ¢Ã?Ã?/% Â??_¢ ? ©ÃÂ¥Ã??ÀÃ>Ã?Â¥` ??¥© /???¢¢ ???,Ã?¢ />? /???¢¢ Â??_¢ /?à ¢¥???Ã? ñ?/_?%â ? ¥©Ã¢à ?>?%??à ??ÂÂÃ?Ã>?â ?> ??????Â¥???Â¥` ?? ¢?Ã??/%?:/Â¥??> ? ¢,?%% /???¢¢ ???,Ã?¢ ?> ¥©à ?>à ©/>? />? ??ÂÂÃ?Ã>?â ?> ?Ã>Â¥ ¢©/??>À /??/>ÀÃ_Ã>¥¢ ?`?%??/% ¢Ã>¢?Â¥???Â¥` />? %/`? ??¢, />? _/Â¥?© ??????Â¥???Â¥` /???¢¢ Õ??¢ ?> ¥©à ?¥©Ã? áÀÀ?ÃÀ/¥à ¢©??,¢ /?à ?>Â¥?????Ã? ?>Â¥? ¥©Ã¢à ©ÃÂ¥Ã??ÀÃ>Ã??¢ /ÀÃ>Â¥ Ã>????>_Ã>¥¢ Â¥? ¢¥??` ¥©à ?é/???? ? ¥©à ??ÂÂÃ?Ã>Â¥ /ÀÃ>¥¢ ?> ?â??>¢à ¥? ¥©Ã¢à ¢©??,¢ ¼©?¢ /????/?© ?¢ ?¢Ã? Â¥? ??Ã>Â¥?Â` ¥©à ?_?%??/Â¥??>¢ /¢¢???/Â¥Ã? ??¥© ??ÂÂÃ?Ã>Â¥ Â??_¢ ? ©ÃÂ¥Ã??ÀÃ>Ã?Â¥` /???¢¢ ???,Ã?¢ />? Â??_¢ ?? ??¥© ??ÂÂÃ?Ã>Â¥ Â¥`?â ? /ÀÀ?ÃÀ/¥à ¢©??,¢
